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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

MARTY LEE GALLEGOS,

:
:

Case No. 860030
Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, plead guilty to one
count of Aggravated Sexual Assault, a First Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-405 (1953 as amended).

Before

sentencing, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea.

That

motion was denied and judgment was entered against Mr. Gallegos in
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, Presiding.

The same court

sentenced the appellant to incarceration in the Utah State Prison
for a term of from 10 years to life.

From the proceedings in the

lower court, this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 14, 1985, the appellant, Marty Lee Gallegos,
entered a plea of guilty to one count of Aggravated Sexual Assault,
a First Degree Felony (R. 22-23).

Two other charges against the

appellant, involving the same victim, were dismissed in exchange for

this plea (R. 24). On September 6, 1985, Mr. Gallegos was ordered
to undergo a ninety day evaluation to provide the trial court with
further information prior to sentencing (R. 25-27).
While Mr. Gallegos was undergoing the ninety-day
evaluation, defense counsel was informed that the alleged victim had
recanted her story (R. 80, 86). In her affidavit the alleged
victim, who was the State's key witness, stated:
previous occasions

"I lied on those

due to pressure from my parents."

(R. 41)

After informing the prosecution of this development, defense counsel
filed a motion on November 25, 1985 to withdraw the guilty plea (R.
29-30) (See Addendum A ) . A memorandum in support of the motion was
also filed (R. 31-36).
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was heard by the
trial court on December 4, 1985 (R. 79). At that time the court
also had before it affidavits from the parties stating their
respective positions (R. 37-42) (See Addendum B). At the conclusion
of the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the trial
court and the prosecution was given time to respond (R. 93).
On December 13, 1985, the trial court denied the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea (R. 97-98) (Addendum C).

The court then

imposed judgment and sentenced Mr. Gallegos to a term of
incarceration in the Utah State Prison (R. 101).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by denying the
Appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Once

the alleged victim had recanted her story and had admitted that the

Appellant was innocent of all assault charges, the court below was
presented with ample "good cause" for allowing the Petitioner to
withdraw his guilty plea and requiring the prosecution to proceed.
The timeliness of the Appellant's motion ensured that no harm would
befall the prosecution or the plea bargaining system.

The court

below committed egregious reversible error when it concluded that
furthering judicial economy was more important than upholding the
Appellant's constitution right to trial.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILT* PLEA.
Under Utah law, a criminal defendant who pleads guilty may
subsequently withdraw that plea "upon good cause shown and with
leave of court."

Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1953 as amended).

A

motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's
discretion and denial of the motion will be reversed on appeal only
when an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.

State v. Hanson, 627

P.2d 53, 54-5 (Utah 1981); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah
1977); State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977).

While this

Court has never established guidelines for determining when
withdrawal of a plea should be granted, both the Federal courts and
the jurisdictions surrounding Utah agree that presentence motions to
withdraw guilty pleas should be granted if the defendant can show
"any fair and just reason" for doing so.

See, e.g., United States

v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979); Barker v. United States,
579 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d
208 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048 (Alaska Ct. App.

1984); Love v. State, 630 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Huttinger, 595 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1979); People v. Martinez, 535 P.2d
926 (Colo. 1975); State v. Jackson, 532 P.2d 926 (Idaho 1975); State
v. Corvello, 363 P.2d 903 (Ariz. 1962).

These jurisdictions concur

that presentence withdrawal requests should be liberally granted.1
In the present case, the Appellant moved the court below to
withdraw his guilty plea 12 days prior to the date set for
sentencing (R. 29, 32) (Addendum A).

The basis for the motion was

the alleged victim's recantation of the rape testimony she had
delivered at Appellant's preliminary hearing.

This recantation

constituted new evidence which was unavailable at the time the plea
was entered.

The recanted testimony rendered the charges against

the Appellant suspect and thereby provided "good cause,11 or a "fair
and just reason" for allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea.
At the time the Appellant entered his guilty plea, the
trial court carefully ascertained that the plea was knowingly and
voluntarily made (R. 45). Appellant contends the court was far less
x

The reason for the distinction between a presentence withdrawal and
a post sentence withdrawal is explained in Kadwell v. United states,
315 P.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963) quoted in 2 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, §538 at 473 (1969):
This distinction rests upon practical considerations
important to the proper administration of justice. Before
sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution
resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as
compared with the public interest in protecting the right
of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty
could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused
might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of
potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence
were unexpectedly severe. The result would be to undermine
respect for the courts and fritter away the time and
painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing process,
[footnote omitted].
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than careful, however, when it denied the motion for withdrawal
based on the technical and dangerously speculative grounds that no
new evidence had been discovered and that the purported victim may
have been coerced into changing her story (R. 98). In so ruling,
the trial court subordinated a defendant's right to trial to the
substantially less compelling state interest in maintaining an
efficient plea system.2

Such abuse of discretion mandates

reversal.3
A. APPELLANT HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
The United States Constitution affords criminal defendants
a certain limited right to withdraw their guilty pleas.

As Justice

Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, noted in his
concurrence in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971):
There is no need to belabor the fact
that the Constitution guarantees to all
criminal defendants the right to a trial by
judge or jury, or put another way, the
"right not to plead guilty," United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581, 20 L.Ed. 2d
138, 145, 88 S.Ct. 1209 (1968). This and
other federal rights may be waived through a
guilty plea, but such waivers are not
lightly presumed and, in fact, are viewed
with the "utmost solicitude". Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274,
279, 89 S.Ct. 1790 (1969). Given this, I
believe that where the defendant presents a
^The Appellant is not arguing that this Court should espouse a
policy which would effectively grant automatic approval to all
defendants wishing to retract their pleas.
Rather, the Appellant's
request is that this Court recognize the present case as an
exceptional circumstance which compels the equitable declaration
that the petitioner may withdraw his plea.
^Even if the victim's recantation in this case doesn't amount to
newly discovered evidence, the equities demand that the Appellant be
afforded his day in court.
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reason for vacating his plea and the
government has not relied on the plea to its
disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and
the right to trial regained, at least where
the motion to vacate is made prior to
sentence and judgment. In other words, in
such circumstances I would not deem the
earlier plea to have irrevocably waived the
defendant's federal constitutional right to
a trial.
Here, petitioner never claimed any
automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentencing. Rather, he tendered a
specific reason why, in his case, the plea
should be vacated. (Emphasis added).
In the present case, the Appellant tendered the most
compelling of "specific reasons" (substantiated by the State's
former key witness) for permitting withdrawal of his plea:
innocence.

In light of Justice Marshall's remarks, it is

questionable whether the Appellant was afforded the full measure of
his Boykin rights.
The Boykin standard, which requires an inquiry into the
factual basis of a guilty plea, is designed to ensure a court that a
defendant actually committed a crime at least as serious as the one
to which he is pleading guilty.

If a trial court is presented with

evidence which seriously questions its factual basis determination
prior to sentencing, a defendant must be afforded his right to a
trial on the merits.

Where the State's key witness admits to lying

after the factual inquiry has already been completed, and where that
lie substantially induced the defendant's plea, the Boykin process
has been subverted.

The trial court must resolve such a dilemma in

favor of the defendant's withdrawal request.

-6-

The Appellant's plea in the present case was voluntary in
that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty.

However, at

the time the plea was entered it was unforeseeable that the victim
would recant her testimony.

The circumstances under which the

Appellant's plea was entered reasonably indicate that the plea was
not an admission of guilt, but rather was entered out of fear of
receiving a greater sentence if the case went to trial.
situation compells compassion.

Such a

If any possibility exists that the

Appellant's actions in the victim's house on July 3, 1985, did not
reach the level of criminal culpability, the Appellant must be
afforded the opportunity to proceed to trial.

Any doubts as to the

fairness of the plea should be resolved in favor of the defendant
and of a trial on the merits.

State v. Koepplin, 689 P.2d 921

(Mont. 1984); State v. Nelson, 603 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Mont. 1979).

B. APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED BELOW A PAIR AND
JUST REASON FOR GRANTING HIS MOTION.
If the defendant can show "the existence of any fair and
just reason, he should be permitted to withdraw his plea, even if
the plea was voluntary."
Ct. App. 1981).

Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Alaska

In those jurisdictions which liberally grant a

presentence withdrawal motion, three key factors are scrutinized
prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion:
In each case, the reason given by the
defendant for withdrawal of a plea must be
examined in light of . . . the extent of
delay in making the request, the amount of
prejudice to the prosecution, and the
possibility that the request constitutes an

-7-

attempt by the defendant to manipulate the
proceedings to obtain an unfair tactical
advantage.4
Wahl 691 P.2d at 1051.
The Appellant caused no delay to any proceeding below
because his motion was filed well in advance of his sentencing date
and immediately after the alleged victim recanted.

Further, unless

asserting the truth and recanting lies can be deemed manipulation of
our criminal justice system, neither the alleged victim nor the
Appellant manipulated the proceedings below.
Similarly, no prejudice to the prosecution arose simply
because the alleged victim recanted her previous story.

Any showing

of prejudice by the prosecution must be substantial for the motion
to withdraw a plea to be denied.
Ct. App. 1981).

Love v. State, 630 P.2d 21 (Alaska

Specifically, in Williams v. State, 655 P.2d 779

(Alaska 1982), the court denied a motion to withdraw a plea because
the prosecution proved that a number of material witnesses were
unavailable.

In Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048 (Alaska Ct. App.

1984), the Williams rationale was upheld where the prosecution
showed it would have to subpoena over twenty witnesses, including
several experts from out of state.

4

In accord with this standard, the ABA Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty (2d ed. 1980) §2.1(a) states:
"After entry of a plea of guilty . . . and before sentencing, the
court should allow the defendant to withdraw the plea for any fair
and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially
prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea."

8

In the present case, prejudice of a sufficient nature
simply does not exist.

The prosecution's sole claim of prejudice

raised in the proceedings below was that the alleged victim's
recantation seriously damaged their case (R. 47). This claim of
prejudice is meritless.

The fact that the truth may undermine the

state's case can hardly be deemed prejudicial.
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the Appellant
acknowledges the state's legitimate concern that pleas not be taken
lightly.

However, in cases such as the present one, general concern

for the integrity of guilty pleas must yield to the paramount
importance of the defendant's right to insist that the prosecution
be required to meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial.

Wahl, 691 P.2d at 1053.

The real danger in the

present case is that the Appellant pled guilty based on the
irrefutable lies

of the alleged victim and is now bound to that

plea even though the lies were recanted prior to sentencing.
Fundamental fairness dictates that the Appellant be granted his day
in court.

CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant
Appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The

court was timely presented with substantial evidence of the
Appellant's innocence.

Egregious reversible error was therefore

committed when the court subordinated the Appellant's constitutional
right to trial to the state's interest in upholding guilty pleas,
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preserving the finality of criminal proceedings and furthering
judicial economy.

This is especially true since granting the motion

would not have resulted in unfair prejudice to the prosecution or
unfair advantage for the Appellant.

Petitioner requests this Court

to order that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea be granted.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S^f^day of March, 1986.

V Kv~o,j )s^> h , v \ ^ '

KHRIS HARROLD
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, KHRIS HARROLD, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
34114, this=QutKday of March, 1986.

VJW-A , V\ toA \->

A
KHRIS HARROLD
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED by

this

March, 1986.
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NOW 885

KHRIS HARROLD (#1394)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 5 3 2-5 444

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

:
:

-v-

:

MARTY LEE GALLEGOS,

:

Defendant

MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA
OF GUILTY

Case No. CR85-807
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson)

:

The Defendant, MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, bv and through his
attorney, KHRIS HARROLD, herein moves this Court to allow a
withdrawal of a plea of guilty in case number CR85-807.
This motion is submitted pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§77-13-6 (1953 as amended) and is based upon recently discovered
evidence which was unknown at the time of the entry of the plea.
D^TED t h i s ^ S ^ day of November, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,

KHRIS HARROLD
Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

day of November, 1985.

NOTICE OF HEARING

TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the above
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the
t-V*V day of ^^og.vwVo ^

> 1985, at the hour °V.ftQ &..m.

before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District
Court Judge.

Please govern yourselves accordingly.

DATED thi3<&S>*Al day of November, 1985.

Attorney for Defendant
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FILED IN C L t H ^ o - Salt Lake County. Utan

NLlVifcu*
KHRIS HARROLD (#1394)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff
-vCase No. CR85-807
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson)

MARTY LEE GALLEGOS,
Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:

SS .

1. MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, being first duly sworn and
upon my oath do depose and state that the following facts are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:
L.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case.

2.

That I plead guilty to one count of Aggravated

Sexual Assault on August 14, 1985.
3.

That I did so upon the advice of mv attorney.

4.

That my primary reason for entering a plea was

to avoid a conviction and possible consecutive sentences.
5.

That I now wish to withdraw my guilty plea.

DATED this

? — d a y of December , 1935 .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this , ? *

day of

December, 1985.

NOTARY PUBLIC

ZAC£^^C/

Residing in Salt Lake County

My Commission Expires

3-i*-26,

-?-

FILED IN CLERICS OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

KHRIS HARROLD (#1394)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Telephone: 532-5444

DEC 4 1985
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff
-v-

:

MARTY LEE GALLEGOS,

:

Defendant

Case No. CR85-807
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson)

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
* ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, GINA ANDERSON, being first duly sworn and upon my
oath do depose and state that- the following facts are true
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:
1.

That I am the alleged victim in the above-entitled

2.

That I wish to recant both previous statements

case.

and previous testimony in the above-entitled case.
3.

That I lied on those previous occasions due to

pressure from my parents.
DATED this
3 day of December, 1985.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this<3

day of

December, 1985.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake Covinty

My Commission Expires

3 -/yva>
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Salt Lake County, uian

DEC 4 1985
KHRIS HARROLD (#1394)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff
-vCase No. Cr35-807
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson)

MARTY LEE GALLEGOS,
Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS .

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, KHRIS HARROLD, being first duly sworn and upon my
oath do depose and state that the following facts are true
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:
1.

I am the attorney of record for the defendant

in the above-entitled matter.
2.

That I advised the defendant to plead guilty

to one count of Aggravated Sexual Assault in the above-entitled
case.
3.

That I did so based upon the facts available to

me at the time of entry of the plea, including testimony
of the alleged victim at the

preliminary hearing.

DATED this ,-g)\vk day of December, 1985.

KHRIS" HARROLD
Attorney for Defendant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c ? r^

day of

December, 1985.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
f v

My Commission Expires :

3 /?-^
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County of Salt Lake

State of Utah
RLE NO:

(Parties Present) : COUNSEL:

TITLE:

£?. SJu^Juct^Z^

&8TATF OF UTAH
^<L/&4*^fo
G.A. CHILDS
ALAN SMI IH"
GHOVER MEDLEY"

D Based upon motion of.
counsel for the
orders the
the reason of.

(Counsel Present)

.Clerk
.Reporter
.Bailiff

•

#. /^M^f^~

HOMhH h WILKINSON
Alt/ /•&.. /<?rlr
DATE:
HON:

Judgt

reset / • continued to

_ the court hereby
for

D The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's
own motion and good cause appearing therefore, it is ordered that said defendant be granted a further stay of
execution of sentence to
•

The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's
own motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the probation of said defendant is terminated and
he is released from supervision.

D Based on non-appearance of defendent,
. / • Recommendation of APPD and
on D motion of the County Attorney or • Court's own motion, it is ordered that a bench warrant issue for said deft.
returnable forthwith •
No Bail •
Bail $
•

•

Based on representation of
heretofore issued against defendant
dismissed.

_-„™™__=_M___

on

Court Orders Bench Warrant
is hereby recalled and

Based upon entry of defendant's plea in case no:
and / • on motiorrtH
counsel for the State / D Defendant, it is ordered that the above entitled case be and same is dismissed.

D Based on motion of D counsel for state •
same is dismissed for the reason of

defendant it is ordered that the above entitled case be and the
_ _ _
.

D Comes now the above named defendant and being represented by counsel as appears above and moves the court
and is granted leave to withdraw his plea of not guilty heretofor entered. Whereupon, the defendant now enters a
plea of guilty to the crime of
and waives time for
passing of sentence and same is set for.
•

Based on the Court's motion, it is ordered that deft, be committed to_
• for 90-day evaluation period • for an additional 90-day evaluation period, and sentencing date is set for.

•

Placed copy of M.E. in APPD Box

r f t

0C^

